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Abstract
Background:  Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH), based on clinical observations, delineates
neuronal networks for interpreting consciousness generation and decision-making. The Iowa
gambling task (IGT) was designed to verify the SMH. However, more and more behavioral and
brain imaging studies had reported incongruent results that pinpointed a need to re-evaluate the
central representations of SMH. The current study used event-related fMRI (functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging) to examine neural correlates of anticipation vs. outcome, wins vs. losses, and
differential decks' contingencies of IGT.
Results: Behavioral results showed a prominent effect of frequency in driving choices. The insula
and basal ganglia were activated during the anticipation phase while the inferior parietal lobule was
activated during the outcome phase. The activation of medial prefrontal cortex was especially
targeted during the high punishment contingencies. The data suggest that under uncertainty the
normal decision makers can become myopic.
Conclusion: The insula and basal ganglia might play a vital role in long-term guidance of decision-
making. Inferior parietal lobule might participate in evaluating the consequence and medial
prefrontal cortex may service the function of error monitoring.
Background
Damasio et al. proposed the Somatic Marker Hypothesis
(SMH) to interpret the function of the medial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC) [1-4]. Earlier neurological studies by
Damasio et al. indicated that the MPFC plays an impor-
tant role in integrating the bodily signals (Somatic
Marker), which provide emotional representation of dif-
ferent external events. In another words, normal decision
makers with intact MPFC can integrate the bodily signals
implicitly and automatically make advantageous real-life
decisions, particularly regarding uncertain events which
cannot be logically inferred. This is supported by clinical
observations that the MPFC patients who retain normal
IQ score may still encounter problems in making real-life
decisions.
Notably, a growing body of behavioral and theoretical
studies of the IGT had pinpointed some possible con-
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founds that may result in misinterpretation of the SMH
[5-11]. Some IGT studies suggested that decision-makers
may actually preferred bad final-outcome deck B to good
final-outcome deck C. Lin and Chiu et al. [6,7] termed this
phenomenon as "prominent deck B". Wilder et al. [9],
MacPherson  et al. [12], Maia and McClelland [8] and
Rodríguez-Sa'nchez et al. [13] also mentioned that normal
decision-makers may be guided by gain-loss frequency
rather than final outcome.
According to neurological studies by Iowa group, Bechara
and Damasio [14,15] defined additional brain regions for
the neuronal network of SMH. Two loops have been pos-
tulated: the "Body Loop" and the "As-if Body Loop". The
neural substrates of both loops include the MPFC, amy-
gdala, insular cortex (IN), somatosensory cortex (S1), and
brainstem nuclei [14]. They suggested that these brain
regions constitute the central representation of the
somatic signal processing in generating the advantageous
decisions. Recently, the Iowa group had enlisted the stria-
tum, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) to extend the neuronal loops of
SMH [15].
However, some neuroscientists [5,10,11] pointed out the
theoretical flaws of these loops for SMH, e.g., there being
little neurological (lesion) evidence of S1 involvement for
the SMH [5]. An increasing number of studies demon-
strated that deficits of proposed somatic loops do not nec-
essarily affect IGT performance [9,16-21]. Many IGT
related studies [9,16-21] provided data incongruent with
the proposed neuronal correlates for SMH. Dunn, et al.
[22], after thoroughly reviewing the SMH and IGT-related
behavioral, physiological, lesion, and brain imaging stud-
ies, reported the diversity of the results [23-30] (see also
Table 1). The imaging studies revealed that except the
MPFC, regions as the anterior cingulate cortex and dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) were highly involved in
decision-making processing during IGT, but were not
included from the proposed main loops by the Iowa
group [14]. The S1 was not activated except in two studies
[23,25]. One major limitation is that these IGT brain
imaging studies only investigated the central representa-
tions for the risk vs. safe or good vs. bad decks. Further-
more, most IGT brain imaging studies focused only on the
MPFC or orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) but did not discuss
other regions associated with probability learning [31,32]
for decision making under uncertainty.
It is noteworthy that the aforementioned studies did not
investigate the critical dimensions of "anticipation" and
"experience" of the decision making, respectively, to elu-
cidate the complexity of the IGT-brain processing. Knut-
son et al. [33] observed that anticipation of reward and the
actual fulfillment of outcome may involve different brain
circuitries. During reward anticipation the nuclear
accumbens was involved while during outcome experi-
ence the MPFC was activated. Moreover, Breiter et al. [34],
using a gambling task comprising both monetary reward
and punishment, demonstrated that anticipation and
experience of monetary gains and losses may have differ-
ent central representations.
In this study, the event-related fMRI (functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging) was exploited to monitor brain activ-
ity associated with gain-loss frequency and final outcome,
respectively. Brain activity during anticipation (decision
driving) and experience (value representation) were deci-
phered to elucidate the neuronal architectures for the two
dimensions in the decision making processing. Detailed
analyses of anticipation and experience of gain, loss and
draw were conducted. Four choices (2 good and 2 bad
final-outcome decks) and the hierarchical changes of
value in IGT were detailed to track the reactive brain
responses. According to the findings obtained by Wilder et
al. [8,9,12,13,18,35-40], normal decision makers should
prefer decks B and D (high-frequency gains decks) over
decks A and C (low-frequency gains decks). The lentiform
nucleus (LN, basal ganglia) should be targeted to deal
with probability information processing [41]. If the SMH
holds, then the MPFC is expected to be activated for the
integration of somatic markers for decision making under
uncertainty.
Results
Behavior data and leaning curve
Behavioral results were similar to those obtained by
Wilder  et al. [6-9,12,13,18,35-40]. Gain-loss frequency
rather than final outcome dominated subjects' behavior.
Behavioral data confirmed the observations obtained by
Lin and Chiu et al. [6,7] in which subjects preferred bad
final outcome deck B of higher-frequency gain to the
other three decks (see Additional file 1). Moreover, the
learning curve indicated that the deck B was relatively
more attractive than the other three decks throughout the
game (see Additional file 2).
Brain activation during anticipation and experience
This experiment result demonstrated that IN and LN
rather than MPFC was correlated with decision process-
ing, particularly during the anticipation period. This
observation supported the hypothesis based on gain-loss
frequency. In the original IGT (under the uncertainty
game), brain activation during anticipation differed mark-
edly from that during experience (Figure 1). Bilateral IN,
LN, right superior temporal gyrus (STG), left inferior pari-
etal lobule (IPL), and ACC were activated during the
phase of anticipatory feeling and guide decisions (Table
2). Conversely, the other brain loops related to the expe-
rience of monetary outcome encompassed the right IPLBMC Neuroscience 2008, 9:72 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/9/72
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[31,42], superior frontal gyrus (SFG) and left middle fron-
tal gyrus (MFG) [43] (Table 3). Brain areas for experience
phase varied more than those for anticipation.
Brain activation of gain, draw and loss
The respective activation during anticipation and experi-
ence of conditions of gain, draw and loss events was ana-
lyzed further. The data showed that the brain activations
of gain, draw and loss during anticipation and decision
processing overlapped considerably, including middle
temporal gyrus (MTG), IN, LN (Figure 2).
On the other hand, brain activations of gain, draw and
loss following outcome appearance (experience) segre-
gated respectively into different regions, mainly located in
the posterior part of the brain. The Precuneus, posterior
IN and posterior MTG were engaged in the experience
phase. Furthermore, the lateral part of the IPL and left
Table 1: Summary of functional brain imaging observations in IGT related studies.
Main loop 
of SMH
Ernst et al.
(2002)
(PET)
Ernst et al.
(2003b)
(PET)
Bolla et al.
(2003)
(PET)
Adinoff et al.
(2003)
(PET)
Tucker et al.
(2004)
(PET)
Bolla et al.
(2005)
(PET)
Fukui et al.
(2005)
(fMRI)
Northoff et al.  
(2006)
(fMRI)
Cortical Areas
Medial 
Prefrontal 
Cortex (R)
VV V V V
Medial 
Prefrontal 
Cortex (L)
VV V V V V
Orbitofrontal 
Cortex (R)
VV V
Orbitofrontal 
Cortex (L)
Dorsolateral 
Prefrontal 
Cortex (R)
V(Extended) V V V V
Dorsolateral 
Prefrontal 
Cortex (L)
V(Extended) V V
Middle Frontal 
Gyrus (R)
V
Middle Frontal 
Gyrus (L)
V
Superior Frontal 
Gyrus (R)
V
Superior Frontal 
Gyrus (L)
V
Somatosensory V
Inferior Parietal 
Lobule
V
Insular Cortex VV V
Anterior 
Cingulate 
Cortex
V(Extended) V V V V
Subcortical Areas
Lentiform 
Nucleus 
(Basal Ganglia)
V(Extended) V
Amygdala V
Hippocampus V
Thalamus V
Brainstem 
Nuclei
V
Cerebellum (L) VV
The table shows divergent results across the brain-imaging studies related to SMH and IGT.BMC Neuroscience 2008, 9:72 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/9/72
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MFG were involved during the outcome phase (experi-
ence) [43]. Bilateral MTG were also commonly activated
in the three conditions, supporting the fact that the activa-
tion of value change is correlated with the bar alteration
on the screen (see computer version of IGT [14]).
Brain activation of decks (A, B, C, D)
During the anticipatory phase, activation was mostly
found in MTG, caudate nucleus (CN), IN, and thalamus
across, although not in all, the four desks. The respective
brain activation map for each deck overlapped substan-
tially during the anticipatory phase. IN engagement was
the only structure identified to be consistent with the orig-
inally proposed main loops of SMH (Figure 3).
During the experience phase, diverse patterns for the four
decks were revealed. The MFG and IPL showed common
activation to the outcomes of all decks. The left Precuneus
and the right IPL were activated only during the experi-
ence phases of deck A and B (a relatively large gain-loss
and bad long-term outcome). The CN tail was activated by
the deck A, C, and D, but not by B (Figure 3). The left Pre-
cuneus was engaged only by deck B.
Time courses of regional activity for 11 monetary values ($ 
+100, $ + 50,  , $ – 350, $ -1150)
The time courses of brain activity for each monetary value
as extracted from significantly activated regions (identi-
fied from the anticipation- and experience-related maps; 5
from the former and 1 from the latter) were depicted
using a peri-stimulus time histogram (PSTH; a default
function of SPM2) (Table 2 &3; Figure 4). The activities of
most involved regions didn't follow the monetary
amount, except for differential responses observed in the
right LN and left STG during the anticipation period (Fig-
ure 4). MPFC activation was only discovered during the
outcome period of $ -1150, which is the largest loss in IGT
(Figure 5).
Discussion
The "prominent deck B phenomenon"
The perseverated behavior of "prominent deck B phenom-
enon" was confirmed as previously reported [6-9,12,13]
albeit that the effect was sub-significant in our current
study (see Additional file 1 and 2). This result corrobo-
rated many IGT-related studies that reported that subjects
actually preferred bad final-outcome deck B of high-fre-
quency gain over good final-outcome decks C or D
[6,8,9,13,18,22,35-40,44,45]. Even Sevy et al., Johnson et
al. and Bechara [46,47] also demonstrated the same
"prominent deck B phenomenon" which was at odds with
their first report [48]. This phenomenon astonishingly
contradicts the basic assumption of IGT which posits that
normal decision makers are prone to avoid the bad deck.
In fact, increasing number of studies consistently showed
that participants preferred decks B and D to decks A and C
[9,13,18,35-40,44,45]. The reason that the earlier studies
failed to demonstrate such phenomenon is that most
studies summed the chosen numbers of deck A and B or
C and D ad hoc, respectively, for inference on the bad vs.
good decks. Notwithstanding, most IGT brain-imaging
Brain activation during anticipation and experience Figure 1
Brain activation during anticipation and experience. 
The red regions (clusters) denoted the brain activation dur-
ing the anticipation period. The result indicated that the bilat-
eral striatum, insular cortex, superior temporal gyrus and left 
anterior cingulate cortex were significantly activated (Ran-
dom Effect: Puncorrected = 0.0001, K = 30). During the anticipa-
tion period (regions mark in red), the insular cortex and 
basal forebrain rather than the medial prefrontal cortex 
dominated the generation of subjective feeling and guided the 
decision-making. On the other hand, during the experience 
period (regions mark in green), the inferior parietal lobule, 
superior frontal gyrus and middle frontal gyrus were involved 
in the consequence assessment of monetary decision (Ran-
dom Effect: Puncorrected = 0.0001, K = 30). The thresholds were 
adjusted for visualization and discussion purpose.BMC Neuroscience 2008, 9:72 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/9/72
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studies did not report in details the subjects' behavioral
data in regards to the preference to four-decks neither.
A few studies out of over one hundred using the similar
four-deck format and addressing the chosen frequency
had consistently demonstrated that the high-frequency
gain decks B and D were preferentially selected than decks
A and C in the control group [6,8,9,13,18,22,35-
40,44,45]. The "prominent deck B phenomenon" indi-
cated that subjects were overwhelmed by the high-fre-
quency gain of decks B, D, and also C (as opposed to A, C
has many standoffs in net value within a trial, see also
Chiu et al. [7]) and prohibited by the high-frequency loss
of deck A. Nevertheless, it still stands that subjects prefer
the good final outcome decks (summation of decks C and
D) to the bad final outcome decks (summation of deck A
and B) albeit the fact that the subjects may actually be
implicitly guided by gain-loss frequency instead of long-
term outcome [6]. Such interpretation may contradict the
SMH reasoning, however, the gain-loss preponderated
choice behavior is not uncommon in the literature on
decision making, suggesting that decision makers are
often myopic to long-term outcomes [49-51], even under
situations of relative certainty [52].
Brain activation for anticipation and experience
In the current study, the IN and LN were strongly associ-
ated with events of uncertain situation. The observation
does not completely support the basic assumption of the
IGT or SMH neural loops [14] which did not posits that
LN participates in the anticipation of uncertainty (Figure
1). The conjoined activation of these two structures might
reflect that positive and negative emotions were simulta-
neously invoked [53] by this uncertain monetary game,
which led to a higher arousal state [54-56]. The arousal
might catalyze the subject into a self-sustained situation
where better psychosomatic condition can be tuned to
augment the explorative intent when confronted with a
challenge of uncertainty, which in turn can be indispensa-
ble for the survival of an organism. Numerous studies
have demonstrated that activation of LN is correlated with
the "expectation" of reward [33,56-62] and habit learning
[41,63] while IN have been reported to be engaged in
most studies on visceral and aversive disposition [64-69].
LN can be critical in attributing the positive emotion of
anticipation [70,71] and motivation, i.e., driving force
[34,61]. On the other hand, IN is not only frequently
associated with generation of aversive sensation, e.g., dis-
gust as induced by the repugnant stimuli [67,68], but also
related to the fear [72] and addition behavior preservation
[73]. The engagement of LN, a neural substrate important
Table 2: Brain activation during anticipation period.
MNI coordinate
Brain Region (Hemisphere)
XY Z Cluster Size
(Voxels) T P FWE-Corr
Insula (R) 40 6 12 148 7.42 0.008
Lentiform Nuclear (R) 26 -2 -6 119 7.37 0.009
Superior Temporal Gyrus (R) 50 -46 10 76 6.77 0.035
Posterior Insula (L) -46 -6 14 96 6.65 0.044
Anterior Insula (L) -34 14 10 67 6.61 0.048
Lentiform Nuclear (L) -16 12 0 202 6.32 0.080
Inferior Parietal Lobule (L) -54 -28 30 31 5.90 0.170
Cingulate Gyrus (L) -4 18 30 32 5.51 0.329
The random effect model was applied with stringent family-wise error correction (thresholded at T = 4.42) and voxel-extent of 30 for presentation 
brevity and discussion purpose.
Table 3: Brain activation during experience phase.
MNI coordinate
Brain Region (Hemisphere)
XY Z Cluster Size 
(Voxel) T P FWE-Corr
Inferior Parietal Lobule (R) 36 -62 44 562 7.68 0.005
Superior Frontal Gyrus (R) 22 10 60 41 5.52 0.294
Medial Frontal Gyrus (L) -42 22 32 76 5.49 0.309
The random effect model was applied with stringent family-wise error correction (thresholded at T = 4.42) and voxel-extent of 30 for presentation 
brevity and discussion purpose.BMC Neuroscience 2008, 9:72 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/9/72
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for probability learning [41,74] echoes the behavioral
results as compelled by the gain-loss frequency.
Following the appearance of outcomes, the activity of LN
and IN (limbic structures), subsided and the overall acti-
vation pattern eminently changed. The circuitries involve
only neocortical areas, mainly encompassing the frontal-
parietal network (IPC, MFG, and SFG) for processing
value representation and logic inspection. The differential
segregation of brain representation in respect to driving
force and experience sentiments during anticipation and
experience [61] (Figure 1) might attest to two systems,
e.g., wanting and liking systems [55,75] to further the elu-
cidation of neural correlates of decision making and the
accompanied interoceptive feeling.
Brain activation for gain, loss and draw conditions
Echoing the behavioral result where the subjects' choices
were implicitly biased by high-frequency gain and not
hunched by the long-term outcome, the almost common
activation pattern in general (Figure 2) during the antici-
pation phase could not decipher or predict the eventual
outcome of gain, loss, or draw conditions. LN, IN, thala-
mus and MTG were commonly involved in the anticipa-
tion phase of three conditions [61]. However, the
overlapped activation patterns diverged into differential
expressions during experience period. The patterns collec-
tively engaged primary visual cortex (V1), bilateral IPC,
SFG, posterior IN and CN [61] where different combina-
tions of neural substrates were noted for respective condi-
tion. The result implies that the organism may entail
subcortical/limbic system rather than logic system (neo-
cortex) to deal with the uncertain situation. On the other
hand, after the gain, loss and draws were clearly presented
to subjects, the logic system (neo-cortex) was recruited to
process these consequences. Our results were inconsistent
with cardinal propositions of SMH that posits the MPFC
crucial in generating the "guts" feeling and biasing the
decision during anticipation (the "hunch" processing in
Damasio's term).
Brain activation for decks
Anticipation commonly activated bilateral CN and ante-
rior IN despite some subtle differences in the activated
foci. This was consistent with the previous findings
according to gain, loss and draw condition (see Figure 2)
preconceived with reward-punishment expectation. The
basal forebrain activation (CN in our study) was engaged
commonly across the four decks and suggested a cognitive
component of probability processing or habit establish-
ment during the task performance. MTG activation may
be related to eye scanning among the four decks while the
activation of postcentral gyrus (S1) and precentral gyrus
(M1) could be attributed to joystick operation. Our find-
ings disagreed with the prediction of SMH that the MPFC,
amygdala, IN and S1 subserve primarily the processing of
somatic signal for decision.
V1, IPL and SFG were commonly activated during the
experience period in addition to other discrete regions
under different deck categories. The neo-cortices (frontal-
parietal circuitries) were targeted for information process-
ing related to outcome. The IGT is extremely complex and
is designed to prevent a subject using the logic reasoning
to find out the long-term benefit. The IGT suggests that
uncertainty can foster the somatic marker (emotion) sys-
tem to harbor decision makers in reaching the foresighted
(rational) status based on long-term processing. This view
is contentious and may be inconsistent with the numer-
ous studies of "emotion", a phenomenon considered irra-
tional, uncontrollable, and immediate [76,77]. The
Brain activation for gain, draw and loss during anticipation  and experience Figure 2
Brain activation for gain, draw and loss during antici-
pation and experience. The red, green and blue repre-
sented the gain, draw and loss respectively. The upper figure 
showed the brain activations in these three conditions during 
anticipation (Random Effect: all conditions, Puncorrected = 
0.0001, K = 30). Most regions of three conditions overlap 
during the anticipation stage. The bottom lower figure indi-
cated that different monetary consequences activated differ-
ent brain regions for different outcomes (Random Effect: 
Gain: Puncorrected = 0.0001, K = 30; Draw: Puncorrected = 0.001, K 
= 10; Loss: Puncorrected = 0.001, K = 10. The threshold levels 
were adjusted for visualization and discussion purpose due to 
the differences of trial numbers in different conditions, inher-
ent in the IGT.BMC Neuroscience 2008, 9:72 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/9/72
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transition from more limbic (anticipation period) to
more cortical (experience period) structures did not war-
rant a better rational behavioral performance in our cur-
rent study. Furthermore, the behavioral results and the
brain activation maps of current study did not demon-
strated substantial differences within and between the
good decks (C, D) and bad decks (A, B). The "instability"
or inconsistent data of IGT across different studies at
behavioral or physiological levels [16-21,78] may pin-
Brain activation for four decks during anticipation and experience Figure 3
Brain activation for four decks during anticipation and experience. The red, yellow, green and blue stand for decks A, 
B, C, and D, respectively. The upper panel indicated the brain response of the four decks. The activations of four decks mostly 
overlapped at the bilateral striatum, insular cortex, middle temporal gyrus, thalamus, and primary sensory/motor cortex (Ran-
dom Effect: all conditions, Puncorrected = 0.0001, K = 30). The left S1/M1 is more active before choice than the right S1/M1, possi-
bly related to the right hand movement and joystick control. Following card-selection, bilateral inferior parietal lobule, insular 
cortex, caudate nucleus, posterior cingulate cortex, frontal eye field and primary visual cortex (V1), as well as right superior 
frontal gyrus were activated (Random Effect: all conditions, Puncorrected = 0.0001, K = 30). These representations may imply that 
the attention system is strongly targeted to evaluate the consequences of decks and logically reasoning.BMC Neuroscience 2008, 9:72 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/9/72
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BOLD response for each monetary value in anticipation and experience Figure 4
BOLD response for each monetary value in anticipation and experience. This figure details the BOLD signal changes 
(peri-stimulus time-activity curve) in response to each monetary value (original value * 50 for New Taiwan dollar currency) at 
the activated voxels with local maxima identified during the periods of anticipation and experience of all trials (see Tables 2 & 
3, Figure 1). The white shadow indicates the period for anticipation modeling; the pink shadow indicates that of experience 
modeling. Only the left lentiform nucleus demonstrates the hierarchical signal changes corresponding to the monetary value of 
the gain at the two seconds after card-turning.BMC Neuroscience 2008, 9:72 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/9/72
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point a possible need for a reconsideration of neuro-phys-
iological and neuropsychological assumptions of SMH.
The role of medial prefrontal cortex in IGT
Damasio [4] stated that "... the brains of the normal subjects
were gradually learning to predict a bad outcome, and were sig-
naling the relative badness of the particular deck before the
actual card-turning." (Damasio, 1994, p. 220). Damasio et
al. [1-3,48] suggested that the medial prefrontal cortex
(MPFC) plays an important role in integrating bodily sig-
nals (Somatic Marker), which provide emotional repre-
sentation of different external events. Normal decision
makers with intact MPFC should be able to integrate the
bodily signals implicitly and automatically make advanta-
geous real-life decisions. This is of particular importance
under the circumstance in face of uncertain events that
cannot be logically inferred. Based on the findings of gal-
vanic skin conductance studies of SMH, it is conceivable
that the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) should be more
activated before selecting the bad decks A or B, namely the
anticipation period.
However, the current study did not observe any significant
activation under these conditions. Only in the experience
period of the largest loss ($ -1150) of desk B that the
MPFC was expressed (Figure 5). The MPFC function may
contribute to the immediate and shortsighted view as
related to error detection [79-87]. The results of this study
imply that MPFC may play a critical role in error monitor-
ing or conflict detection [79,88-91], but might not solic-
BOLD response of the medial prefrontal cortex under large loss ($ -1150) condition of deck B Figure 5
BOLD response of the medial prefrontal cortex under large loss ($ -1150) condition of deck B. The detailed anal-
ysis for each monetary value found the significant activation (Random Effect: Puncorrected = 0.001, K = 30) of medial prefrontal 
cortex during the experience period of large loss condition. Bilateral inferior parietal lobule and posterior cingulate cortex, left 
frontal eye field, supplementary motor area, and insular cortex were also activated.BMC Neuroscience 2008, 9:72 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/9/72
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itly play a role in the integration of somatic markers
(bodily responses) and guiding decisions rationally in the
long-run. Further studies are needed to exam this specula-
tion since the results cannot discern the different statisti-
cal power calculated from different numbers of trials for
each monetary value. For example, the "$ 100 and $ 50"
comprised over 70% of trials, but "$ -1150" comprised
only 1–3% for each (subject) run. This problem is inher-
ent with the IGT design.
Notably, the right IN manifested the greatest BOLD signal
response during the standoff condition. We speculated
that the IN may be related to the calibration of mental
account or emotion state. On the other hand, right LN
corresponded to the hierarchical change of gain, and not
to loss in IGT (Figure 4, more activity in NT$ 5000, NT$
2500 and see Additional file 3) in face of uncertainty. This
observation similar to many studies on risk of relative cer-
tainty [32-34,57-62,92,93] and is congruent with the view
that basal ganglion is related to biological reward system.
General discussion
This study aimed to disclose neural correlates involved in
decision-making processing during anticipation and expe-
rience period of the IGT. There are several points that
mandate more comprehensive studies for clarification in
the future. For example, testing of final-outcome, gain-
loss frequency, and prominent deck B phenomenon at the
behavioral level reveal only sub-significance. The limited
findings of behavioral data may result from the internal
variation of IGT and emotions interfering with the per-
formance of the MR-scanning procedure. Whether there
exits gender difference of brain activation patterns is of
pertinent interest. For instance, Bolla et al. reported a gen-
der difference in the activity of OFC and DLPFC during
IGT using a gender-balanced approach [94]. Nevertheless,
regions such as the basal ganglia [95] and parietal cortex
[31,32], suggested to be involved in reward-based proba-
bility learning [41,74] under uncertainty, was not empha-
sized by Bolla et al. study. On the other hand, the negative
finding of the ventro-orbital MPFC in this study could
possibly be attributed to the susceptibility signal loss of
fMRI acquisition.
Our behavioral and imaging findings differed from previ-
ous IGT-fMRI studies. Caroselli et al. [35] investigated a
large population (seventy-one male, sixty-three female)
demonstrated also the "prominent deck B phenomenon"
and absence of learning curve. A careful review of IGT-
fMRI studies disclosed that only Northoff et al. [29] pre-
sented detailed behavioral data for a four-deck format and
demonstrated the "prominent deck B phenomenon".
Albeit the discrepancy in the behavioral data with original
IGT, the MPFC was found to be activated. The IGT-fMRI
study by Fukui et al. presented behavioral data for the IGT
with a two-deck format [25] and perfectly replicated the
original findings as reported by the Iowa group's study in
1994 [48]. However, Fukui et al. behavioral data contra-
dicted with a recent study by Sevy et al., and Johnson et al.,
and Bechara on the "prominent deck B phenomenon"
[46,47]. Tanabe et al. utilized a modified IGT, not original
IGT [96], and focused on the functional discrepancies of
the ventral MPFC between substance users and a control
group. These studies mainly focused on brain activity
changes of the MPFC and OFC in either good-bad or risky-
safe conditions (two deck format) without discussion on
the basal ganglia and parietal cortex in decision-making
processing. Notwithstanding, no information was tai-
lored to the "prominent deck B phenomenon". Recently,
Chiu et al. [97] used a modified IGT, namely the Soochow
Gambling Task (SGT) which possess a relative simple and
balanced gain-loss structure than IGT, but keeps all uncer-
tain characteristics of IGT. The experiment result of SGT
clearly demonstrated that decision makers' choice was
dominated by the gain-loss frequency rather than final-
outcome. The heterogeneity of the experimental para-
digms and discrepancies of the resulting behavioral data
as well as the different approaches for fMRI data analysis
command a need to further profound and comprehensive
studies for an empirical account for the SMH theory and
MPFC function. All the existing behavioral and brain
imaging literature actually pinpointed that IGT can be not
that optimal to validate the SMH. Therefore, the VMPFC
engagements by the IGT remain elusive and mandate a
further clarification.
Conclusion
Our data indicated that both LN [41,56] and IN [68,98]
can be targeted for decision-making during anticipation
of decision-making under uncertainty. IPL and SFG could
be involved in the appreciation of the consequences of
choices. Common brain processing might occur during
the anticipation periods of gain, loss and draw conditions,
but the varied outcomes may predispose different neural
substrates for the various experiential dimensions. A sim-
ilar transition also occurred in the four-deck conditions.
The MPFC was founded to be activated only during the
experience period of the largest loss of deck B, but not dur-
ing anticipation period. The original proposition of SMH
that MPFC should be implicitly engaged under ambiva-
lence to monitor and inhibit the selection of the bad final-
outcome deck by the decision makers is not supported by
the current study. This study suggests that under the con-
frontation of uncertainty the normal decision makers can
become myopic. LN and IN might play more vital role in
generating the "feeling" accompanying anticipation
which in turn can drive for final decision while MPFC may
serves more the function of online monitoring and error
detection. Consequently, the involvement of conscious-
ness in guiding the decision will be very important inBMC Neuroscience 2008, 9:72 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/9/72
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understanding the mechanism of covert (emotion) –
overt (rational) coupling [99].
Methods
Subjects
Twenty-four college and graduate school students, 19 to
32 years old (Mean age = 21.0 years old; SD = 3.1; 8 males,
16 females) participated in this study. They had not
played the IGT before. Written informed consent was
obtained from each subject prior to the experiment. Prior
to the experiment, each subject gave informed consent to
the experimental protocol, which had been approved by
the Institutional Ethics Committee of Taipei Veterans
General Hospital. The experiment was conducted in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Paradigms
Each subject was asked to play a computerized four-deck
IGT game according to the original design [48]. Subjects
were asked to turn a card from the 4-decks voluntarily.
The inside of the card was either in black or red, which was
unrelated to gain or loss. The subjects were instructed to
maximize gains and minimize losses when playing the
game. The IGT contained four decks. Decks A and B had
potentially large immediate gains ($ 100) and losses ($ -
50 to $ -1150) in each trial and a disadvantageous final-
outcome ($ -250) from the average of ten trials. Decks C
and D had small immediate gain ($ 50) and loss ($ -25 to
$ -200) and an advantageous final-outcome ($ 250) (for
detailed gain-loss structure and instructions for IGT,
please refer to the references [48,100,101]). Subjects did
not know the internal IGT structure of gain and loss. The
game ended with a total of 100 trials. Different card-dis-
play arrangement (ABCD, BCDA ...etc.) for each subject
was implemented to counterbalance the card position
effect and possible confound of eye movement. Subjects
were instructed to play the game using real monetary
value (New Taiwan dollar, NT) and were rewarded with
their final winnings (divided by 1000). For example, a
subject with an account balance of NT 320,000 at the end
of the game was rewarded with 320 NT dollars (~US$ 10).
The time interval of 6 seconds preceding the button press
Computer version of IGT and event-related fMRI design Figure 6
Computer version of IGT and event-related fMRI design. Participants were free to consider which deck they wished to 
choose. The anticipation period encompassed 6 seconds prior to the button press (0 second) for fMRI data. The experience 
period started from button press. The timing of each selection was jittered by subject's free contemplation. Each subject's 
time-specific selection pattern was used to model the fMRI signal. After the button-press, the computer displayed the mone-
tary value of gain, loss, or draw via changes in the top bar. The computer displayed the consequences of choices for 8 seconds, 
during which the participants were unable to press the button.BMC Neuroscience 2008, 9:72 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/9/72
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was defined as anticipation period and the interval after
was defined as experience period (see Figure 6 and legend
for details).
Subjects conducted a short practice version of IGT for
familiarization (with different internal structure of gain
and loss) before actual scanning and during the tri-pilot
scanning inside the MRI-scanner. The fMRI inter-trial
interval was set to be longer than 10 seconds to increase
the sensitivity of event-related design [101]. Subjects were
free to select the card without time constraint. To avoid
the MRI-signal inhomogeneity and the inter-session con-
founds, the experiment was devoid of 9 interruptions as
the original IGT game where the subjects were asked two
questions after each 10 trials [8,102-104]. Subjects used a
joystick with a press-button for card selection. All subjects
completed the fMRI-experiment in less than 1 hour. The
structural and anatomical images were acquired after a 15
minute break outside the scanner.
fMRI data acquisition
Images were acquired using a 3.0 T Bruker MedSpec S300
system MRI (Kalsrube, Germany) with a quadrature head
coil. The subjects' heads were immobilized with a vac-
uum-beam pad in the scanner. Functional data were
acquired with a T2*-weighted gradient-echo EPI using
BOLD contrast (TR/TE/θ = 2000 ms/50 ms/90°, slice
thickness = 5 mm, interslice interval = 1 mm, Field of view
(FOV) = 230 × 230 mm2, 64 × 64 × 20 matrix, whole brain
coverage). The first five images (dummy images) of each
session were discarded from the analysis to eliminate pos-
sible non-equilibrium effects of magnetization. The ana-
tomical image was acquired using a high-resolution T1-
weighted, 3D gradient-echo pulse sequence modified
driven equilibrium Fourier transform (MDEFT); TR/TE/TI
= 88.1 ms/4.12 ms/650 ms, slice thickness = 1.5 mm, 256
× 256 × 128 matrix, FOV = 230 × 230 mm2.
Data processing and analysis
The computer version of IGT (programmed with Matlab
6.5) was used to register the behavioral profiles and deci-
sion time-points. Image and statistical analyses were proc-
essed with SPM2 (Welcome Department of Cognitive
Neurology, London, UK) and displayed using xjView 4.0
(Human Neuroimaging Lab, Baylor College of Medicine,
Houston, TX, U.S.A). Scans were realigned, coregistered,
normalized, time corrected and spatially smoothed with a
4 mm full-width-at-half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian
kernel using standard SPM methods. Because of the free
choice and event related design, each subject performed
100 events (choices) in total and the scan (image) number
ranged from 547 to 652 (scans). General Linear Model
(GLM) was first used to model the event-time course for
each subject. Regional differences were statistically thresh-
olded at corrected (family-wise error correction) PFWE-Corr
= 0.05, voxel extent (K) = 30 in within-subject analysis. A
random-effect model was applied for the final second-
level (between-subject) analysis (Puncorrected = 0.0001, K =
30). Coordinates of Z(T)-maxima were registered in
Talairach and Tournoux's 3-D brain stereotaxic system
under MNI template in the SPM [105]. The images were
displayed in neurological convention (the left hemisphere
in the image is the left hemisphere of subject).
We shifted forward the hemodynamic response function
(hrf) by 6 seconds (3 scans) as indexed to the button press
and the epoch ("hrf (with time derivative)" in SPM) was
modeled as pre-choice event for anticipatory phase. The
epoch backward ("hrf (with time derivative)" in SPM) as
indexed to the button press was modeled as post-choice
event for experience phase. The experimental designs for
the four types of comparisons were listed below: 1) total
events:  anticipation- and outcome-related brain activation
across all subjects; 2) gain-loss status: gain, draw, and loss-
related brain activation across all subjects; 3) deck category:
A, B, C, and D-deck related brain activation across all subjects;
4) time course of brain activity according to monetary
value in NT$ (US$): 5000(100), 2500(50), 1250(25), 0, -
1250(-25), -2500(-50), -5000(-100), -7500(-150), -
10000(-200), -12500(-250), -57500(-1150). Cerebral
activity corresponding to each monetary value was
extracted from the mostly-activated voxel out of regions
identified in brain activation maps from 1). Activity read-
outs from trials of the same monetary value (not same
amount of trials across all monetary values) in each indi-
vidual were first averaged respectively and then averaged
across 24 individuals (a few conditions were averaged
with a relatively small number of subjects). Brain activity
maps for respective anticipatory and experience phases of
each monetary value across 24 subjects were also
obtained. For brevity and discussion purpose, we particu-
larly focused and presented the findings on the MPFC, i.e.,
medial prefrontal cortex.
According to the original design of IGT, the IGT is highly
uncertain in comparison to other gambles. Each subject's
choice pattern is very different from those of other sub-
jects because subjects possess variant choice numbers and
schedules for specific event (e.g., -1150). The time point
of a specific event was retrieved from behavioral data to
register the brain signal of a specific event. xjView 4.0 was
exploited for the result display.
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